Wage & Hour - Development & Highlights : New Jersey Labor and Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Fox Rothschild LLP Law Firm : Serving Essex County, Sussex County, Roseland, New Jersey

Five years ago, the Class Action Fair Act (“CAFA”) was enacted to deal with the onslaught of class action cases and to ensure, if I may say, fairness in the manner in which these cases were litigated but it appears that the ever active and creative plaintiffs bar is coming up with new ways to allow cases to remain in state court, rather than going to federal court where perhaps they feel or believe that the chances of winning are slimmer.  Defense counsel must adjust and adapt, quickly.

What some plaintiff counsel are doing is structuring and narrowing their Complaints so they can circumvent the jurisdictional diversity that the law mandates be applied. The fact is that CAFA was enacted to prevent abuse of the class action procedure/device.  The law eased the rules for establishing diversity jurisdiction so plaintiff lawyers could not engage in ting forum-shopping and lodge their suits in what they believed were states friendly to the plaintiff’s side. In this manner, defendants were able more facilely to remove cases to the federal courts.

The trick that has been discovered is to plead the case quite narrowly, in a real focused manner. For example, if the case is filed for less than one-hundred plaintiffs and damages of less than five million dollars are sought, the lawyers may be able to salvage keeping the case in state court, which they may perceive as a tactical advantage or may, in fact, be a tactical advantage.   In this analysis, the particular venue and/or the particular judge that preside over the case.

Often, class action cases settle. Rarely do they go to trial, given the enormous risks for the employer, i.e. fee-shifting, as well as for plaintiffs and their lawyers, who stand to realize nothing from a case if the class action motion is defeated or the case falls on the merits, e.g. employees found exempt, as a class.  Thus, there is much machination to get a case before the “right” judge who may broker. Whether with heavy hand or not, a settlement.

A recent, illustrative example. In a 2008 case involving Abbott Laboratories, a federal judge in the Eastern District of Tennessee ruled that the plaintiffs were trying to evade the dictates of CAFA by filing eleven class action Complaints, which mirrored each other, except that the period of time for which recovery was sought was different for each  “class.”   The various complaints defined the class period as various one-year periods ranging from 1990-2008.

However, each of the discrete Complaints included contentions relating to the entire reach of the charged conspiracy for all of the separate time periods in the ten years at issue.  The judge held that these artificial time demarcations were an attempt to ensure that the damages in each case were less than five million dollars, in order to circumvent CAFA. Essentially, he found that the plaintiffs were “gerrymandering” the cases to avoid the application of the CAFA.

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A federal judge has agreed to a settlement between the parties in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action where a group of former employees sued the employer, a cement company, for overtime. The case, filed in federal court in Florida, is entitled Webster v. Cemex Inc.

Interestingly, the lead plaintiff, Timothy Webster, will recover only $2,600. Payments to the other class members have not been disclosed. The basis of the suit was that the Company paid the drivers by the delivery and did not pay overtime when the actual work hours exceeded forty (40).  The plaintiffs sought compensation for unpaid overtime for three years (seeking a willfulness finding) as well as liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees.

Although the Company asserted it had strong defenses against the claim, it settled this case, which had been consolidated with a second FLSA action against Cemex; that action was also lodged by drivers.

The issue comes back to exemption status.  If the drivers were non-exempt, they were entitled to overtime when they worked more than forty hours.  There is a computational formula built into the FLSA for determining how to compute overtime to workers paid by the delivery, or by the “stop” or on a commission basis, or a day rate, or any other form of compensation.  Ultimately, the employer must figure out the regular rate and then determine the overtime.

These drivers might or might not have fit within the motor carrier exemption, but likely no other exemption, certainly not the white collar exemptions as they were not paid a salary.  The lesson for employers is simple----absent an applicable exemption, all workers are entitled to overtime, regardless of the applicable computational methodology.
 

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Law firms are usually defending clients in wage-hour suits where the allegation is that the employee claims he/she has been misclassified as exempt when they are really not and are due overtime. But, law firms themselves must be diligent about properly classifying their own employees, especially when they categorize employees exempt under the administrative exemption. This is the lesson being learned by the so-called boutique intellectual property law firm of Turocy & Watson LLP, where a legal secretary has filed a class action, charging that the firm did not properly pay the “class” of secretaries overtime.

The case is docketed as Osolin v. Turocy & Watson, LLP et al filed in federal court in the Northern District of Ohio and charges a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.. The plaintiff believes there are approximately 30 legal secretaries in the class. All of these secretaries were paid a salary and were allegedly misclassified as exempt.

The complaint alleges that none of the plaintiffs did any managerial work or directed the work of employees, or had authority to hire and fire. Under that factual predicate, the plaintiffs would not fit within the executive exemption, but the firm will likely defend on the basis that they are administrative employees. As I have often warned, this is the most difficult exemption to prove and if the facts show that the secretaries performed secretarial, clerical work the majority of the time, this exemption will not be available as it will founder on the “discretion and independent judgment” element.

It is highly doubtful that the firm could show they were professional employees, even if the employees were given the moniker “paralegal,” as paralegals are explicitly deemed non-exempt under the federal regulations.

The burden of proof is always on the employer in an exemption case. This behooves employers, law firms or otherwise, to make reasoned, defensible exemption determinations and classifications at the time of hire, because it only takes a single plaintiff to start a world of trouble. In sum, these lawyers need a lawyer.
 

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Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, ("FLSA") compensatory time is statutorily prescribed for governmental-entity employees.  29 U.S.C. 207(k). Generally, compensatory time is impermissible in the private sector.  The US Department of Labor (“DOL”), however, does allow the use of so-called “time-off plans.”  Time-off is very similar to compensatory time but involves leave taken during the same pay period.  Time-off plans are only allowed under the following conditions:

1) The employee must get time off at time and one-half (1 ½) for all hours over forty (40) worked in a week; and

2) The employee must take the compensatory time off during the same pay period in which it was accrued.

Dunlop v. New Jersey, 522 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 427 U.S. 909 (1976); Wage Hour Opinion No. 913 (December 27, 1968) (employer may not credit an employee with compensatory time even at time and one-half rate if taken subsequent to the pay period in which the overtime is earned).

For example, an employee who works fifty (50) hours the first week of a biweekly pay period can take off fifteen (15) hours in the second week and, accordingly, only work twenty-five (25) hours during the second week without the cash payment of any overtime.  If the fifty (50) hour week occurs in the second week of the pay period, then the overtime premium must be paid in cash.

It appears that an employer can require that an employee accept compensatory time in lieu of being paid cash overtime provided the boundaries of the individual pay period are not exceeded. The US DOL has approved, by Opinion Letter, a procedure by which an employer could lay off an employee for a fixed number of hours in the second week of the pay period in order to offset the compensatory time earned in the first week of the pay period. 

In another Opinion Letter, the DOL held that the FLSA does not prohibit an employer from maintaining employee salaries at a constant level by controlling the number of hours worked; approving “layoff” concept in second week of a bi-weekly pay period.  By analogy, an employer could “order” an employee to take compensatory time in the second week of the pay period, as opposed to being required to pay cash overtime, even if the employee preferred to be paid in cash.

The kicker for employers is that if they allow private sector employees to bank overtime and the DOL comes in, albeit for an unrelated reason, and discovers that, the agency will deem it a violation and order the employer to pay the employees their “overtime.”  The DOL may also (and probably will) impose penalties for late payment of wages and/or improper payment of overtime.
 

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I have posted a few times about Fair Labor Standards Act donning and doffing cases. The general rule is that donning and doffing is compensable if these preliminary and postliminary activities are integral to the performance of the employee’s primary job.

For a rule, there is always an exception. In a case entitled Johnson v. Koch Foods Inc., filed in the Eastern District of Tennessee, a federal judge has ruled that because the parties’ labor contract applicable to covering chicken processors working at a cut and kill plant explicitly excluded compensation for time spent donning and doffing certain sanitary and safety gear, the workers were not entitled to compensation for the time it took to put and remove the gear.

The judge analogized the putting on/taking off of the gear to “changing clothes,” which is not compensable under Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court did warn, however, that of a jury determined that such activities were integral and indispensable, they then could be compensable under the “continuous workday rule.”

This result seems anomalous because the workers were required to put on the protective gear prior to reporting to the production line, to begin their primary work, but they were only compensated for the time actually on the line.

There is a divergence in the federal Circuits as to what constitutes “clothes.” The Ninth Circuit has held that the “changing clothes” safe harbor applies only when the items at issue are clearly and unmistakably clothing, as is commonly understood. However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the term applies to hairnets, gloves and hearing protection equipment. The US Department of Labor has issued an Opinion Letter concluding that the Section 203(o) definition of clothes “includes items worn on the body for covering, protection, or sanitation.”

This issue may ultimately have to be decided by the US Supreme Court. In the meantime, employers need to make assessments of the indispensability of the preliminary activity to the main job and start the analysis of compensability from that vantage point.
 

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