In a very interesting and off-beat decision, the Third Circuit has thrown out one class of loan officers who alleged misclassification but let stand the lower court’s decision that certified the case as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The case is entitled Reinig et al. v. RBS Citizens NA, and issued from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

The panel overruled the decision that had given certification to Loan Officers across ten States who alleged that they were not properly paid for time off the clock.  However, the Court allowed the decision granting collective action certification to stand as it opined that it did not have jurisdiction over that issues as a component of the Employer’s interlocutory appeal.

The Court addressed the issue of “pendent appellate jurisdiction.”  This means that the appellate court is allowed in certain scenarios to assert jurisdiction over issues that are not allowed to be appealed independently but that are “intertwined” with matters over which the Court has jurisdiction.  The Court herein first observed that FLSA collective certification orders are not appealable because they are not final and further concluded that the order in this case was not “inextricably intertwined” with the Rule 23 class certification determination.  Thus, the Court would not exercise pendant jurisdiction over it.

The Court stated that “in so holding, we are persuaded by our prior precedent and the Second Circuit’s well-reasoned decision in [Myers v. Hertz Corp. ] that Rule 23 class certification and FLSA collective action certification are fundamentally different creatures.  Further, judicial efficiency notwithstanding, the myriad problems that could result from exercising jurisdiction in this context counsel against expanding the narrow doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction in the way Citizens proposes.”

The legal requirements for conditional certification of FLSA claims is less onerous than securing class certification under Rule 23.  The Court also noted that if it concluded that pendant jurisdiction could be asserted over FLSA certification, then, in the future, a party could “abuse the doctrine” by filing insipid interlocutory appeals so that litigant could get appellate review before a final decision on that issue has been rendered by the district court.

In another (very) interesting twist, the Third Circuit criticized the lower court for not doing its job of specifying the particular classes and claims that were involved.  Indeed, the Court stated that it was compelled to “comb through and cross-reference multiple documents in an attempt to cobble together” the classes and claims that might be amenable to class adjudication.

The Takeaway

Rule 23 claims are harder for a plaintiff to establish as a class.  The danger is that the Rule 23 action is an opt-out, not an opt-in, as a FLSA collective action is; everybody is in except for a handful that might opt out.  It is an interesting twist because I think the Court is right—there would be defendants/employers who would utilize this vehicle as a poor man’s way of getting the collective action certification issue examined sooner rather than later.

Sounds only like good lawyering…

The retail industry is notoriously prone to FLSA collective action misclassification lawsuits because there are many levels of management, especially so-called lower management, where the employees may/may not discharge actual/true supervisory powers. Another illustration of this principle has resulted in a large dollar settlement that will pay employees known as “sales team managers” a fairly large amount of money, although the exact amount has not been disclosed. What was disclosed is that the plaintiffs’ lawyers will receive almost two million dollars in attorney fees! The case is entitled , and was filed in federal court in the Eastern District of Texas.

ArbitrationThe Judge examined the six-factor test under the Fair Labor Standards Act for granting approval to such settlements and concluded that there was no evidence of fraud and also, importantly, that the settlement addresses the plaintiffs’ possibility of prevailing on the merits. The Court stated that “after considering the factors, the court finds that the settlement agreement should be approved because it is a fair and reasonable settlement of a bona fide dispute.”

The hundreds of sales team managers claimed that they performed the same job duties as their subordinates, such as selling, restocking products and maintaining the organization of the store and the clothing racks. The employees denied that they performed any managerial tasks, such as hiring or firing. In sum, they alleged that although they had the title of “manager,” they were not at all performing the tasks required under the Part 541 regulations that address exempt status. There were 384 workers who had opted in.

As is typical in these cases, the parties devised a formula for determining the amounts of money workers will receive. It will be based on the number of weeks they worked in the three years before they opted in. It remains unclear the aggregate amount of money that the employees will receive, as that (important) fact was redacted.

The Judge noted that the fourth factor, the “probability of the plaintiffs’ success on the merits,” was the “most important factor absent fraud and collusion.” The Judge observed that the employees “face considerable hurdles in succeeding on the merits.” Thus, the Judge concluded that the settlement represented a “fair and reasonable recovery.”

The Takeaway

As these lawsuits are so common, my advice to my clients for years has been to treat lower level managers as non-exempt and pay them hourly. It is possible to take the salary being paid and “back into” a correct hourly rate so that, even with the anticipated overtime worked, the employer’s labor costs will not be increased. That puts an end to the threat of a misclassification lawsuit.

It works…

Working time claims/lawsuits take many forms and often arise out of seemingly unlikely circumstances.  In a recent case, the Third Circuit ruled that temporary workers brought in to take over the jobs of locked out workers cannot receive pay under the FLSA for their time spent travelling to and crossing the picket line.  The case is entitled Smith et al. v. Allegheny Technologies Inc. et al. and issued from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

On Strike

The panel held that riding across the picket line in vans provided by an industrial strike staffing company was not their principal activity nor was it integral to their principal activity.  Those are the factors that determine if a particular tangential (or preliminary) activity is compensable.  The Court held that the travel time was not a principal activity just because the employer mandated particular travel procedures.  The workers were driven to the facility, across the picket line, from their hotel, which was almost an hour away.

The Court noted that “for example, a temporary workforce’s commute would be a principal activity if members of that workforce were simply hired to cross the picket line in the morning, enter its factory, and then re-cross the picket line at night.  Similarly, a complaint could allege facts that demonstrated the employee’s crossing the picket line was as important as the work the employee subsequently performed. But no such facts were alleged here.”

The Court also stated that this picket line crossing was not “integral or indispensable” to the job of making steel.  The Court stated that “taking a Strom van to work was at least two steps removed from their steel production duties.”

The Takeaway

This is the correct decision.  This was, in essence, home-to-work commuting which is never compensable under the FLSA.  Yes, there was an interesting variation on the theme but the Court found that the principle remained inviolate.  Still, employers must always be wary of the pre-work activities their employees engage in as a collective action could be lurking around the corner.

Or just down the road…

Many employers these days have timekeeping systems that deduct time (e.g. thirty minutes) for lunch on a daily basis.  There is an inherent danger in doing this, as employees may claim that they worked through lunch and therefore should be paid.  This is evidenced in yet another settlement in such an action, a settlement that totals $1.5 million.  The case is entitled Magpayo v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp. and was filed in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois.

Lunch BreakThe collective action involved hundreds of emergency room nurses.  This class submitted papers to a federal Judge asking approval of the settlement, which will include 262 ER Nurses.  The motion noted that the employer would have continued to litigate and there were risks, for the plaintiffs, in maintaining the suit.

The motion stated that “the traditional means for handling wage claims like those at issue here — individual litigation — would unduly tax the court system, require a massive expenditure of public and private resources and, given the relatively small value of the claims of the individual class members, would be impracticable.  The proposed settlement, therefore, is the best vehicle for class members to receive the relief to which they are entitled in a prompt and efficient manner.”

As stated above, the theory of the case was worked lunch breaks were going unpaid because of the automatic deductions.  The lead plaintiff also claimed the Hospital did not pay for overtime when more than forty hours were worked and that she had to work after she clocked out.  The class had been certified under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The plaintiffs wanted to settle because there was a risk the class could be decertified and greater expense would be incurred.  The motion noted that by asserting that “additional litigation would only serve to increase the expenses incurred without reducing the risks facing class members.”  The layers will receive $600,000 in fees.

The Takeaway

Automatic lunch deduction systems are legal but there must be a reporting mechanism, a fail-safe mechanism, for when employees do work through lunch (or claim they do).  The employee is trained to fill out a form, submit it to the supervisor for approval, and payment.  Then, the employer is protected and the employee properly paid for a true missed lunch break.

Sounds simple, yet these suits keep happening?

I have defended many off-the-clock working time cases and I submit that they are very dangerous for employers. This is because they are particularly amenable to class certification because it is likely that there is a common policy applicable to the members of the class. This premise is highlighted by a recent settlement for a class of security guards employed by a security and facility services at JFK International Airport. The settlement is $2.52 million deal. The case is entitled Douglas v. Allied Universal Security Services et al., and was filed in federal court in the Eastern District of New York.

The plaintiff, Kirk Douglas, requested court approval of the settlement through a motion that labeled the settlement fair and reasonable. The motion stated that “in short, while plaintiff continues to believe in his case, and class counsel has and will continue to capably represent their client’s interests in litigation and mediation, they recognize that Allied has presented significant, and potentially dispositive arguments, that pose a significant risk to their chances for class-wide recovery, and this favors preliminary approval.”

The theory of the case was that the employees were compelled to drive to their bases before they clocked out for the day and they were required to do paperwork after their shifts. There was also an allegation that the employees worked through lunch time. The employees in the class (which totaled about six hundred people) were airport security agents, operations assistants and employees dubbed Tour Supervisors, who were claimed to really not be exempt employees.

The settlement came to be after a mediation. The plaintiffs asserted that while they believed in the rightness of their claims, the Company “has mounted considerable defenses to liability and damages.” In that regard, the Company resisted the contention that the employees were actually performing “work” in these off-the-clock situations. The motion asserted that the proffered settlement was “a good value” given the risks inherent in the litigation. The motion stated that “in class counsel’s estimation, the settlement represents a meaningful percentage of the recovery that the class members would have achieved had they prevailed on all their claims, survived an appeal, and sought to enforce and collect upon a judgment.”

The Takeaway

The activities alleged to be working time in this case are troubling because they are the kind that a good-faith, well intentioned employer might not perceive to even be “work.” That is the problem. Employers have to be aware that any activity that they either compel their employees to perform or which are integral to their jobs may be working time and therefore, compensable.

At least be aware of the possibility…

 

It is not often when an employer defends a FLSA lawsuit by asserting that it is in an illegal business and therefore immune to suit. Sound funny? Well, that is precisely what a Colorado employer that furnishes security services to legal cannabis growers/sellers has pressed on the Tenth Circuit. The employer’s theory is that the workers are not entitled to allegedly unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act because their work is illegal under federal law. The case is entitled Kenney v. Helix TCS, and was argued before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

The Company’s counsel argued that the collective action cannot proceed as the FLSA only applies to legal businesses. The lawyer claimed that all job functions engaged in by the workers amount to trafficking in illegal drugs. This case is fascinating because it highlights the tension between a state legalizing cannabis and its continuing illegality under federal law. The lawyer for the Company argued that this controversy entered the “legally ambiguous” sphere in which legal cannabis businesses operate.

The named plaintiff, an armed security guard who guarded growers and sellers, claimed he worked overtime many weeks and was not paid properly. He sought class certification for all such guards, going back three years. The Company moved to dismiss, arguing that the employee’s work (as he was dealing with a Schedule 1 drug under federal law) violated the federal Controlled Substances Act and was thus outside of FLSA coverage.

The district court Judge denied the motion and observed that other courts have not endorsed this concept. The Judge noted that in other cases involving businesses that violate federal laws, e.g. immigration, courts have ruled that these violations did not mean the businesses could not comply with other federal laws. However, the Judge certified the ruling for immediate appeal and thus it went (quickly) to the Tenth Circuit.

The lawyer for the plaintiff asserted that the FLSA does not have a requirement that employees subject to its jurisdiction must be engaged in “only” legal businesses. There was no outright mention of “lawfulness” in the law and there was nothing in the state statute that voided the dictates of the FLSA.

The Takeaway

Maybe Congress should make an exception to the FLSA for this industry, but it has not done so. Consider the implications of granting the employer’s motion to dismiss—it would be giving a business illegal under federal law an advantage over legal businesses by sanctioning the avoidance of paying overtime.

Hmm. Food for thought…

When a class action is filed, often times there are issues (for the plaintiff and their counsel) as to who should be in the class. Often, the named plaintiff will seek to reach out to other putative class members, but it is not every day when a Judge orders that the plaintiff may telephone or email these other class members, despite a claim that this would unfairly facilitate the plaintiff’s case. That is what a New Jersey federal judge has just ordered. The case is entitled Sanchez v. Santander Bank NA et al., and was filed in federal court in the District of New Jersey.

computer-email

The theory of the case is that the employer coerced employees into not filing for overtime; the named plaintiff claims the information will help her figure out if the workers are class members. The Judge denied Santander’s bid to limit contact and now the plaintiff can contact Branch Operations Managers at more than 600 banks spread across nine states. The Judge allowed this unrestricted access to facilitate the plaintiff’s discovery efforts. There are more than 1100 other possible class members.

The Judge observed that the plaintiff “is already in possession of the contact information for potential opt-ins, and the court sees no basis to prevent plaintiff from investigating whether or not these employees are similarly situated to plaintiff by limiting the scope or means of communication.”

The theory of the suit was that the Bank prohibited these employees from reporting extra hours worked or ostensible overtime. There were also allegations that the Bank punished/disciplined employees who did attempt to report the extra time worked. The named plaintiff asserted that she implored upper management to hire more employees or dispatch help from other branches, but these initiatives went nowhere. The named plaintiff claimed she had to work 10-12 extra hours per week, without pay.

The Bank had argued that Sanchez’ contact with potential plaintiffs should be limited to those Branch Managers she worked with or who were in the immediate geographical area. The Bank also opposed Sanchez calling or emailing other workers, contending that any communications should be confined to the letter that the Judge had approved.

The Takeaway

I don’t like this. It seems that the courts often make it easier for plaintiffs to do the “best” job that they can in securing the biggest class they can. The plaintiff already had the addresses so these people could have easily been contacted in the more traditional manner.

Seems the pendulum swings a little far to the left on this one…

This is an interesting case because it combines the elements of necessary, but not proven, commonality of situation for class certification and a quirky element of overtime calculation based on a unique FLSA provision.  The bottom line is that the two workers who sought a class action on both the federal and state levels lost both because of the need for too much individual scrutiny of worker claims.  The case is entitled Sinclair et al. v. PGA Inc., and was filed in federal court in the Western District of Wisconsin.

The Judge rejected the claim, for a class, that the Company should have paid the higher wage rates for skilled labor (e.g. trade work, such as carpentry) as opposed to generic wage rates.  The Judge also agreed to decertify a FLSA collective whose overtime rates were allegedly miscalculated or underestimated.  The Judge opined that the state-law part of the suit did not possess several elements of a viable class action under Rule 23, citing to the need for too much individual attention needed for each worker’s situation.  The Judge also observed that no other worker had opted into the suit, and this fact “undermines the entire purpose of a collective action.”

The theory was that the employer violated the Wisconsin prevailing wage law by paying workers at a lower, general for work done to support more skilled work.  The plaintiffs alleged that this practice violated the FLSA because the rate should have been that which they earned before overtime kicked in as opposed to the lower-rated work they were actually performing in the overtime hours.

Importantly, the Judge denied the request for class certification on the prevailing wage claims.  The Court held that the workers failed to meet the numerosity requirement, as they could not make a showing as to the actual number of workers who worked the lower-rated support work.  They also could not meet the “predominance” requirement, meaning that the underpayment theory applied to most members of the class.

The Judge stated that the claim of the employees is based “not just on the amount, but also on the type of work” each class member did, and would force the court to make “an individual determination of whether an employee’s work on a specific week, day and even hour made possible, supported or cleaned up after a skilled trade worker.”  The Court added that a trial would focus on individual workers’ “unique work on an hourly, daily or weekly basis” and whether it should have been paid at higher wages, the workers did not meet the “superiority” requirement that they show a single class case would be better than a series of individual cases.

The Takeaway

Here, the workers lost the federal and state class actions.  The state case is quite interesting because it shows a path for employers sued in class actions in prevailing wage cases how they can defeat the motion for class certification.  I have preached this dogma for years and repeat it proudly now, again.

Individual scrutiny destroys a class!

The world of prevailing wage law is a complex and nuanced one. It is, in truth, a niche within a niche of the wage-hour world. I have handled almost one hundred prevailing wage audits and lawsuits and still am learning things about how these laws are interpreted. In an interesting twist, the New York State Court of Appeals has examined the issue of when apprentice wages can (and cannot) be paid on prevailing wage projects. The case is entitled International Union of Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council No. 4 v. New York State Dept. of Labor and issued from the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

The Court held (in agreement with the NYS DOL) that apprentices who are not discharging the job functions of their trade must be paid the higher, journeyman wages.  The vote was 6-1.   The Court stated “we uphold the statute-based policy of the New York State Department of Labor that the payment of apprentice wages on public work projects to apprentices who are performing tasks that are within the respective trade classifications of the approved apprenticeship programs in which they are enrolled.”

The Union sponsored a DOL-approved glazier apprenticeship program, but during their work as apprentice glaziers, these workers may have to discharge some Ironworker job duties.  The plaintiffs sued, asking for a judgment that as long as the tasks were performed under the aegis of the apprentice program, it did not matter that they were doing other tasks covered by other trade jurisdictions.  The DOL took the view that this work demanded payment at that craft’s rate (a much higher rate).

The lower court dismissed the suit but an appellate tribunal revived it, holding that “glazing contractors may compensate apprentices registered and enrolled in the DC 4 Glazier Apprenticeship Program in accordance with the applicable apprentice rates posted by defendant New York State Department of Labor on taxpayer financed projects.”  That panel also was concerned that apprentices could be improperly used as “cheap labor.”   The highest NYS court agreed, finding “there is a substantial risk that employers would seek to use cheaper labor whenever consistent with the construction market.”

The Takeaway

Construction contractors need to be very careful when they do prevailing wage projects, as there are many minefields for the unwary employer.   This case highlights but a single one of these.

There are many more…

I often settle FLSA actions, as do many other lawyers, defense and plaintiff. It makes sense for both sides, given the costs and uncertainties of litigation and the protracted time it takes for a case to weave its way through the courts. There is now a growing controversy as to the degree that such settlements need to be reviewed by the courts. This dilemma has now found its way to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a case that may produce a watershed result. The case is entitled Yu v. Hasaki Restaurant Inc. et al., and was argued before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

A sushi chef who sued his employer and the employer wanted to settle the lawsuit for $20,000. The district court Judge (Jesse Furman) maintained that the statute required him to review the settlement for appropriateness. The matter has now been appealed to the appellate court where oral argument (and some tough questioning by the appellate panel) took place.

The plaintiff’s lawyer argued that Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provided that any agreement reached under that Rule had to be entered as a judgment. One of the appellate judges seemed to disagree, stating that this Rule was not intended to be used in that manner. The Judge observed “really, what is 68(a) about? … It’s about getting people to accept settlements in torts.” The lawyer responded that “it’s meant to create a settlement where there are disputes about the facts and what’s owed.” The lawyer noted that these kinds of disputes often exist in wage-and-hour cases.

The lawyer for the advocacy group Public Citizen asserted that the district court was right. She stated that the Judge Furman was correct in looking towards the Second Circuit’s recent holding in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House for guidance. That case closed the door on settling and dismissing FLSA cases under FRCP 41. The plaintiff’s lawyer countered by stating that there is no similar requirement in Rule 68, as there is in Rule 41, i.e. making sure that no other statute would preclude the proposed settlement.

Judge Debra Ann Livingston’s inquiries allowed the plaintiff’s lawyer to go into a speech about the long amount of time it takes for settlements to be approved by district courts. That Judge was also dubious of the applicability of the Cheeks holding. She observed that Rule 68 settlements were matters of pubic record, while Rule 41 settlements could be (and were) negotiated in a private setting.

The Takeaway

Settlements are such a vital part of the FLSA-litigation process that any obstacle that gets placed in the way of the facilitation of such settlements is bad for both plaintiff and the defendant…