When a class action is filed, often times there are issues (for the plaintiff and their counsel) as to who should be in the class. Often, the named plaintiff will seek to reach out to other putative class members, but it is not every day when a Judge orders that the plaintiff may telephone or email these other class members, despite a claim that this would unfairly facilitate the plaintiff’s case. That is what a New Jersey federal judge has just ordered. The case is entitled Sanchez v. Santander Bank NA et al., and was filed in federal court in the District of New Jersey.

computer-email

The theory of the case is that the employer coerced employees into not filing for overtime; the named plaintiff claims the information will help her figure out if the workers are class members. The Judge denied Santander’s bid to limit contact and now the plaintiff can contact Branch Operations Managers at more than 600 banks spread across nine states. The Judge allowed this unrestricted access to facilitate the plaintiff’s discovery efforts. There are more than 1100 other possible class members.

The Judge observed that the plaintiff “is already in possession of the contact information for potential opt-ins, and the court sees no basis to prevent plaintiff from investigating whether or not these employees are similarly situated to plaintiff by limiting the scope or means of communication.”

The theory of the suit was that the Bank prohibited these employees from reporting extra hours worked or ostensible overtime. There were also allegations that the Bank punished/disciplined employees who did attempt to report the extra time worked. The named plaintiff asserted that she implored upper management to hire more employees or dispatch help from other branches, but these initiatives went nowhere. The named plaintiff claimed she had to work 10-12 extra hours per week, without pay.

The Bank had argued that Sanchez’ contact with potential plaintiffs should be limited to those Branch Managers she worked with or who were in the immediate geographical area. The Bank also opposed Sanchez calling or emailing other workers, contending that any communications should be confined to the letter that the Judge had approved.

The Takeaway

I don’t like this. It seems that the courts often make it easier for plaintiffs to do the “best” job that they can in securing the biggest class they can. The plaintiff already had the addresses so these people could have easily been contacted in the more traditional manner.

Seems the pendulum swings a little far to the left on this one…

Employers are always trying to cut off the head of a class action, i.e. the named plaintiff, in order to bring the case to an end. What happens when the named plaintiff is gone from the case but some people have opted in? Do they become named plaintiffs, with the case continuing?  The Eleventh Circuit has seemingly answered that question in the affirmative. The court has just ruled that workers who opt into collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act only have to file that little piece of paper, the consent form, to then become a named party to the case,  The case is entitled Mickles et al. v. Country Club Inc.

The Elbert P. Tuttle U.S. Courthouse in Atlanta, Georgia, now home to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
By Eoghanacht [Public domain], from Wikimedia Commons
Importantly, the ruling is a published one, meaning it is precedential. The panel reversed the lower court which held that the three opt-ins were not properly added to the case and should have been eliminated from the suit after the original plaintiff did not succeed in securing conditional certification and then settled. The Judge who wrote the decision stated that this was a case of first impression.

The Court noted that the FLSA, on its face, buttressed the conclusion that workers who opt into a collective “become party plaintiffs upon the filing of a consent and that nothing further, including conditional certification, is required.” The Court stated that “we conclude that filing a written consent pursuant to [FLSA] section 216(b) is sufficient to confer party-plaintiff status.”

The case was filed in 2014 by a single named plaintiff Andrea Mickles, a dancer at Goldrush. The suit alleged that the company (Country Club Inc.) had misclassified her and other dancers as independent contractors and thus they were denied proper minimum wages and overtime monies. She sought a class of current and former dancers; three other dancers then opted in by filing consents.

The lower court denied the motion to conditionally certify the class, as it was filed beyond the deadline set forth in local court rules for such a motion. There was no mention, however, of what would happen to the three opt-in plaintiffs. The Company then asked the court to specify which individuals would stay in the case. The company claimed the opt-ins had never become named party plaintiffs and thus were eliminated from the case when the conditional certification motion was denied.

The three additional workers claimed they could not be dropped from the case because the conditional certification motion was denied. The lower court held that the three had not been ruled similarly situated to the original plaintiff and had not been joined to the collective action. Then, the original plaintiff settled with the company and the three opt-ins appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

That appellate court noted that there was no determination made as to the “similarly situated” element for the three workers, as needed to be done. Although opt-ins must be similarly situated to the original plaintiff, as no ruling on this issue had been made, the three employees stayed as parties until that ruling was made; if they were not ruled to be similarly situated, then they would be dismissed from the case.

The Eleventh Circuit therefore ordered that the opt-in cases be dismissed without prejudice so they were free to refile their claims, or proceed with their own suits. The court stated that “the “appellants were parties to the litigation upon filing consents and, absent a dismissal from the case, remained parties in the litigation, Thus, the district court erred in deeming appellants non-parties in the clarification order, which had the effect of dismissing their claims with prejudice.”

The Takeaway

This is a major change in the FLSA litigation landscape and makes it harder for an employer to get a case dismissed or to even settle a case. Yes, it is only one circuit, but the reasoning and rationale may spread to other circuits.

I hope not…

There have been many class actions concerning the job title “Assistant Manager” and this malady has risen again.   The chain, Hooters, has been sued in a nationwide collective action that alleges the Company misclassified assistant store managers, calling them supervisors, in order to avoid paying overtime.  The case is entitled Stirewalt et al. v. Hooters of America LLC and was filed in federal court in the Northern District of Alabama.

Hooters Restaurant
By Ildar Sagdejev (Specious) (Own work) [GFDL or CC BY-SA 4.0-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0], via Wikimedia Commons
The named plaintiffs allege that they worked up to eighty (80) hours per week but were never paid overtime due to their misclassification.  The claim they only had the title of Manager, but that their main duty was sales and not the supervision of at least two other employees, over whom they could exercise managerial authority.  They claim that when they did create schedules, they were “almost always changed,” according to the Complaint.  They claim that although they interviewed new job applicants, the recommendations they made were often ignored by their supervisors.

More significantly, the Complaint alleges fraudulent conduct by the Company. It alleges that the “defendants have intentionally and repeatedly misrepresented the true status of managerial compensation … to avoid suspicion and inquiry by employees regarding their entitlement to monies owed to them.  Plaintiffs, as well as other similarly situated present and former employees, relied upon these misrepresentations by defendants and [were] unable to determine [their] true status under the FLSA by the exercise of reasonable diligence because of those misrepresentations.”

The plaintiffs want notices to be sent to current and former assistant managers who worked at a Hooters store within the last three years.  This would allow these workers to opt in to the collective action.  The plaintiffs seek overtime, commissions, bonuses, vacation and sick time and, naturally, attorneys’ fees.

The Takeaway

I don’t mind these so much.  (Famous last words?)  These kinds of actions usually necessitate an individualized determination of the duties of the various employees and that is the death knell of a viable class action.  The problem is if they were subject to the same, uniform, system-wide policies, that would be bad.  But, at least from the start the defendant here has a legitimate, viable chance of defeating the motion(s) for class certification.

There have been a number of cases in which the FLSA employee status of exotic dancers has been litigated.  Well, in a very recent one, the plaintiffs’ counsel is strongly attacking the Company’s early summary judgment motion.  The dancers argued they were employees, not independent contractors; the Court has now granted conditional certification to the class.  The case is entitled Shaw et al. v. The Set Enterprises Inc. et al., and was filed in federal court in the Southern District of Florida.

Former dancers Sarah Shaw, Rebecca Wiles and Ashley Howell argued that the amount of control exerted over them by the club owners was the key in deciding what their status should be.  The plaintiffs reeled off many cases in which just such findings were made.  Their papers noted that their “position is not novel; the vast majority of courts to have considered this issue have found exotic dancer/entertainers to be employees as a matter of law.”

Their theory was a willful misclassification had occurred and they were paid only through tips from the customers.  The class was granted conditional certification in December 2016, as the Court found that a sufficient evidentiary showing was made indicating 300 entertainers worked at the two clubs during the three years leading up to the lawsuit and all were similarly situated.

The owners asserted they were independent contractors who just paid a “modest fee” to the club as a licensee, in exchange for being allowed to perform, use the facilities and collect tips and fees from the clientele. They also asserted they exercised no control while they were dancing and performing.

An attorney for the plaintiffs said that notice was being sent to 4,500 prospective class members.  He opined that, in the end, these people would be considered employees under the law, as they have in many other cases.  He said that “there’s been very strong precedent over the last ten years or so, consistently, in nearly all courts, that has found entertainment dancers do qualify as employees. We believe the same will be found under the facts of this case.”

The Takeaway

These cases are very fact-sensitive, but I agree that the majority of them rule that these folks are employees.  This case is interesting in the sense that an ultimate decision on the merits has not been made, but the opt-in notices are being sent to prospective claimants.

This is an interesting case and a (possible) double victory for the employer.  A rarity.  An employer-defendant, Dynamex, Inc. has filed a motion to eliminate more than 30 opt-ins from a conditionally certified collective action under the FLSA seeking back due wages for overtime violations.  On that very day, the employer won the right to access some of the opt-in members’ tax records.  The case is entitled Juan Saravia v. Dynamex Inc. and was filed in federal court in the Northern District of California.

Tax returns
Copyright: lobzik / 123RF Stock Photo

The Company wanted some opt-ins eliminated because they failed to show up for their depositions and others because they withdrew their consent to participate in the suit.  The Company also challenged opt-ins because they were not part of the originally proposed class definition or they did not opt-in on time or they were contracted to work outside of California or were deceased.  The Company urged to the Court that “absent the requested dismissal, this court will be allowing the inclusion of eighteen (18) additional opt-ins at trial in a case where individualized determinations are a necessity and the interest and diligence of the opt-ins is at question.”

The theory of the case is that although the Company labeled the workers as independent contractors, the Company controlled the routes, schedules, customers and other details for thousands of U.S. drivers, which would show too much control, meaning that they were actually statutory employees.  At this time, 155 drivers have opted in.

On that same day, as luck would have it, the Judge ordered 36 collective action members to turn over their federal tax records relevant to their claims from 2008-present when they were contractors for the Company.  The class members had objected on invasion of privacy grounds and that the demand was a pretext for harassment.  The court disagreed, concluding that the plaintiffs’ privacy interests did not supersede the Company’s interest in preparing and advancing a fully formed defense on the merits of the case.

The Court aptly and cogently found that “the tax records that Dynamex seeks will provide probative information indicating the structure of each plaintiff’s businesses, the nature of their income and expenses, and the extent of their gross income, which will be useful in demonstrating whether each of the opt-ins was properly classified as an ‘independent contractor’ or not.”

The Takeaway

This is a great victory, securing the tax returns.  Moreover, and more importantly perhaps, it tilts the momentum of the case in favor of the employer.  Regretfully, most times, the employer is placed in the unenviable position of being reactive and always warding off the next attack by plaintiffs.  Maybe the plaintiffs do not want to open up their tax returns for scrutiny.  Maybe this will cause the plaintiffs to want to settle or be more reasonable in any settlement demands.

I applaud the tactic.  Let it be a signal to other defendant counsel out there.

A putative class of delivery truck drivers has filed a collective action FLSA lawsuit against Bimbo Bakeries, alleging a failure to pay overtime.  The case is entitled Oddo et al. v. Bimbo Bakeries U.S.A. Inc. and was filed in federal court in the District of New Jersey.  The plaintiffs will seek conditional certification and try to get the ability to send opt-in notices to affected employees.

Bakery
Copyright: maxsheb / 123RF Stock Photo

The plaintiffs claim that by paying drivers a flat rate of $110 per week plus 12% commission on sales, the Company violated both federal and state law.

The Complaint alleges that the “plaintiffs assert that defendants failed to pay named plaintiffs and those similarly situated proper overtime compensation and failed to implement a system to track the number of hours worked each work week.” The Complaint contends that the drivers, titled “route sales representatives,” could not improve their commissions since they had no sales training and “the amount of sales that named plaintiffs made to a retailer along their delivery routes was mainly determined by the volume of the retailer’s sales to its customers since named plaintiffs’ last delivery.”

There have been many other FLSA lawsuits against this Company, which is a multinational bakery company based in Mexico; the Company owns several brands, including Sara Lee, Entenmann’s and Thomas’. The Company has also settled several cases with fairly large dollar payouts over the last six years.  By contrast, the class here is no more than forty employees (if they all opt in).

The Takeaway

Overtime cannot be waived nor can it be paid through compensation arrangements which, although fair or even generous, do not comply with the law.  The employer here must either keep employees to forty hours or less or pay them overtime.

There are legal ways to pay overtime and yet not experience an increase in labor costs.  This Company must examine any number of procedures for effecting compliance and still being efficient and profitable.  They do exist!

I believe the Company can do it…

Whenever a class action is defended, the main defense is, always, too much individual scrutiny is needed to allow a class to be formed.  This is exactly what a group of defendants has just now urged a California federal court to find and thus decertify a conditional class of workers claiming they were denied overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The case is entitled Sandoval et al. v. Ali et al.. and was filed in federal court in the Northern District of California.

Copyright: leaf / 123RF Stock Photo
Copyright: leaf / 123RF Stock Photo

The workers clam that they were not paid for non-repair-related tasks and they also claim that they were not properly compensated for downtime; the employers claim that each of these claims has to be assessed individually because they are not similar enough to belong to a single class or to opt in to the conditionally certified FLSA class.  Indeed, the defendants noted that the court itself already compared the theories of recovery to “shifting sands.”

The defendants brief aptly noted that “each variation has been tied to unique, individualized or specifically anecdotal scenarios based on cases that are dissimilar to the facts of this case, but there has not been any evidence of any class-wide policy, procedure or practice at use [in] all shops let alone a single shop that would warrant the FLSA conditionally certified class to continue as a class action.”

The defendants argued that the standard for conditional certification is much lower because that kind of certification is granted “not on the merits,” but rather because, in that limited and narrow setting, naked allegations can carry the day.  However, the defendants cogently argued that “by contrast, [for] the decertification of FLSA collective actions or final certification of FLSA collective actions, the burden on plaintiffs is substantially greater and requires a demonstration of substantial similarity between the plaintiffs and opt-ins.”  The defendants conclude by bluntly noting that “plaintiffs cannot meet this burden.”

The Takeaway

Anything that can be espoused that will tend to show individuality or that individual scrutiny is needed should be thrown up as a defense.  For example, in this case, there were several FLSA class members and a number of opt-in workers that allegedly had claims beyond the statute of limitations period, so their circumstances would also be different.  The employer here has cogently asserted that decertification is mandated because proving liability under these circumstances will necessarily default into making numerous individual inquiries over time worked.

Music to my ears.  Hope it works.

Usually, when a party does not respond to discovery requests, it can face sanctions, including the dismissal of the case (if he/they are the plaintiff(s).  Well, that truism took a hit the other day when a New Jersey federal judge did not dismiss the claims of two opt-in plaintiffs in a FLSA collective action against General Electric Company, as the Court concluded that the delays in their responding to discovery by service technicians, who have charged they were not compensated for off-the-clock duties, did not mandate dismissal of their case.  The case is entitled Maddy et al. v. General Electric Co., and was filed in federal court in the District of New Jersey.

Copyright: marsil / 123RF Stock Photo
Copyright: marsil / 123RF Stock Photo

Although the plaintiffs had a lengthy history of delinquent discovery responses, including a year-long lack of response to certain discovery requests, the Judge refused to throw their claims out.  The Judge examined the so-called Poulis factors, the Third Circuit six-part standard  to determine whether to dismiss a case for failure to comply with discovery and concluded that, in their totality, the standards weighed against dismissal. The Court found that “the only factors which somewhat weigh in favor of dismissal are the extent of the parties’ personal responsibility and the history of dilatoriness.”

The Judge found no evidence to support the employer’s claim that it had been prejudiced by the discovery delay nor was there any evidence that the two opt-ins had acted in bad faith when eventually responded to the May 2014 request in September 2015.  Significantly, the Judge also found that the plaintiffs’ claims seemed meritorious (which is one of the Poulis factors) as the defendant had not filed a motion challenging the legal sufficiency of the claims.

The allegations were that employees were doing preliminary, off-the-clock work.  The employees charge that spent time on integrally connected tasks, including time spent logging in to the computer system in order to download jobs, responding to emails and travel time.  Importantly, they allege that their supervisors intimidated them when they tried to report the time worked on their timesheets.

The Takeaway

This case evidences the “leniency” with which courts allow plaintiffs to continue to press their claims, even in the face of dilatory (beyond words) conduct in responding to discovery.  It seems if the defendant had made some motion to dismiss or challenge the claims, on their own merits, the result might have been different.

The bigger issue is whether, in reality, the employees were working off-the-clock or performing tasks so directly connected to their primary jobs that those sideline activities became compensable.  If supervisors intimidated employees not to report the time, that is bad enough on its own and worse, it will fortify the allegations of how many hours they claimed they worked.